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I.

Introduction

Here is one of the central differences between late eighteenth century
constitutions and late twentieth century constitutions: The former make no mention of
rights to food, shelter, and health care, whereas the latter tend to protect those rights in
the most explicit terms. A remarkable feature of international opinion – firmly rejected in
the United States – is that socio-economic rights deserve constitutional protection.
But should a democratic constitution really protect the right to food, shelter, and
medical care? Do “socio-economic” rights of this sort belong in a Constitution? What do
they have to do with citizenship? Do they promote or undermine democratic deliberation?
If such rights are created, what is the role of the courts?
My aim in this Essay is to shed light on these questions, largely by discussing an
extraordinary decision by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, one that carries some
significant lessons for the future.1 In the Grootboom decision, the Court set out a novel
and promising approach to judicial protection of socio-economic rights. This approach
requires close attention to the human interests at stake, and sensible priority-setting, but
without mandating protection for each person whose socio-economic needs are at risk.
The distinctive virtue of the Court’s approach is that it is respectful of democratic
prerogatives and of the limited nature of public resources, while also requiring special
deliberative attention to those whose minimal needs are not being met. The approach of
the Constitutional Court stands as a powerful rejoinder to those who have contended that
socio-economic rights do not belong in a constitution. It suggests that such rights can
serve, not to preempt democratic deliberation, but to ensure democratic attention to
important interests that might otherwise be neglected in ordinary debate. It also
illuminates the idea, emphasized by the Court itself, that all rights, including the most
conventional and uncontroversial, impose costs that must be borne by taxpayers.
To be sure, it is far too early to say whether the Court’s approach can fully
accommodate the concerns of those who object to judicial protection of socio-economic
rights. But for the first time in the history of the world, a constitutional court has initiated
a process that might well succeed in the endeavor of ensuring that protection without
placing courts in an unacceptable managerial role. This point has large implications for
how we think about citizenship, democracy, and minimal social and economic needs.
*
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A. A Debate and A Resolution

1. In general. For many years, there has been a debate about whether social and
economic rights, sometimes known as socio-economic rights, belong in a
constitution.2 The debate has occurred with special intensity in both Eastern Europe
and South Africa. Of course the American Constitution, and most constitutions before
the twentieth-century, protected such rights as free speech, religious liberty, and
sanctity of the home, without creating rights to minimally decent conditions of life.
But in the late twentieth century, the trend is otherwise, with international documents,
and most constitutions, creating rights to food, shelter, and more.
Some skeptics have doubted whether such rights make sense from the standpoint
of constitutional design. On one view, a constitution should protect “negative” rights, not
“positive” rights. Constitutional rights should be seen as individual protections against
the aggressive state, not as private entitlements to protection by the state. For people who
share this view, a constitution is best understood as a bulwark of liberty, properly
conceived; and a constitution that protects “positive” rights can be no such bulwark,
because it requires government action, rather than creating a wall of immunity around
individual citizens.
But there are many problems with this view. Even conventional individual rights,
like the right to free speech and private property, require governmental action. Private
property cannot exist without a governmental apparatus, ready and able to secure
people’s holdings as such. So-called negative rights are emphatically positive rights. In
fact all rights, even the most conventional, have costs.3 Rights of property and contract,
as well as rights of free speech and religious liberty, need significant taxpayer support.
In any case we might well think that the abusive or oppressive exercise of government
power consists, not only in locking people up against their will, or in stopping them from
speaking, but also in producing a situation in which people’s minimal needs are not met.
Indeed, protection of such needs might be seen as part of the necessary wall of immunity,
and hardly as inconsistent with it.
If the central concerns are citizenship and democracy, the line between negative
rights and positive rights is hard to maintain. The right to constitutional protection of
private property has a strong democratic justification: If people’s holdings are subject to
ongoing governmental adjustment, people cannot have the security, and independence,
that the status of citizenship requires. The right to private property should not be seen as
an effort to protect wealthy people; it helps ensure deliberative democracy itself. But the
same things can be said for minimal protections against starvation, homelessless, and
other extreme deprivation. For people to be able to act as citizens, and to be able to count
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themselves as such, they must have the kind of independence that such minimal
protections ensure.
On the other hand, a democratic constitution does not protect every right and
interest that should be protected in a decent or just society. Perhaps ordinary politics can
be trusted; if so, there is no need for constitutional protection. The basic reason for
constitutional guarantees is to respond to problems faced in ordinary political life. If
minimal socio-economic rights will be protected democratically, why involve the
Constitution? The best answer is that to doubt the assumption and to insist such rights are
indeed at systematic risk in political life, especially because those who would benefit
from them lack political power. It is not clear if this is true in every nation. But certainly
it is true in many places.
Perhaps more interestingly, critics of socio-economic rights have made a point
about democratic institutions. In particular, they have argued that socio-economic rights
are beyond judicial capacities.4 On this view, courts lack the tools to enforce such
guarantees. If they attempt to do so, they will find themselves in an impossible
managerial position, one that might discredit the constitutional enterprise as a whole.
How can courts possibly oversee budget-setting priorities? If a state provides too little
help to those who seek housing, maybe it is because the state is concentrating on the
provision of employment, or on public health programs, or on educating children. Is a
court supposed to oversee the full range of government programs, to ensure that the state
is placing emphasis on the right areas? How can a court possibly acquire the knowledge,
or make the value judgments, that would enable it to do that? There is a separate point. A
judicial effort to protect socio-economic rights might seem to compromise, or to preempt,
democratic deliberation on crucial issues, because it will undermine the capacity of
citizens to choose, in accordance with their own judgments, the kinds of welfare and
employment programs that they favor. Of course some of these points hold for
conventional rights as well. But perhaps social and economic rights are especially
troublesome on this count, because they put courts in the position of overseeing largescale bureaucratic institutions.
It would be possible to respond to these institutional concerns in various ways.
Perhaps constitutions should not include socio-economic rights at all. Perhaps such rights
should be included, but on the explicit understanding that the legislature, and not the
courts, will be entrusted with enforcement. Section IV of the Indian Constitution
expressly follows this route, contained judicially unenforceable “directive principles” and
attempting to encourage legislative attention to these rights without involving the
judiciary.. [Could you mention the section(s) in the Indian Constitution?] The advantage of
this approach is that it ensures that courts will not be entangled with administration of
social programs. The disadvantage is that without judicial enforcement, there is a risk that
the constitutional guarantees will be mere “parchment barriers,” meaningless or empty in
the real world.
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2. The case of South Africa. The appropriate approach to socio-economic rights
was intensely debated before ratification of the South African Constitution.5 The idea of
including socio-economic rights was greatly spurred by international law, above all by
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which I will
return. Much of the debate involved the appropriate role of the judiciary. In part this was
a relatively abstract debate, posing a concrete real-world issue but founded on a set of
theoretical considerations just sketched, involving judicial capacities and the proper
place, if any, of socio-economic rights in a democratic constitution. But aside from these
points, the debate was greatly influenced by the particular legacy of apartheid and by
claims about what to do about that legacy at the constitutional level. In the view of many
of those involved in constitutional design, the apartheid system could not plausibly be
separated from the problem of persistent social and economic deprivation. In the end the
argument for socio-economic rights was irresistible, in large part because such guarantees
seemed an indispensable way of expressing a commitment to overcome the legacy of
apartheid – the overriding goal of the new Constitution.
We should emphasize a general point here about constitutionalism.6 Some
constitutions are preservative; they seek to maintain existing practices, to ensure that
things do not get worse. This is of course Edmund Burke’s conception of the English
constitution. By contrast, some constitutions are transformative; they set out certain
aspirations that are emphatically understood as a challenge to longstanding practices.
They are defined in opposition to those practices. The American constitution is a mixture
of preservative and transformative features, with some provisions looking backward, and
others very much looking forward. The South African constitution is the world’s leading
example of a transformative constitution. A great deal of the document is an effort to
eliminate apartheid “root and branch.” Constitutions are often described as
precommitment strategies, designed to ensure against myopic or mistaken decisions in
ordinary politics.7 If is it apt to describe the South African Constitution in these terms,
this is because the document is designed to ensure that future governments do not fall
prey to anything like the evils of the apartheid era. The creation of socio-economic rights
is best understood in this light.
B. A Continuing Debate
But what, in particular, is the relationship among socio-economic rights, courts,
and legislatures? The South African Constitution hardly speaks unambiguously on this
topic. The rights in question typically take the following form, in an evident
acknowledgement of limited resources:
1. Everyone has the right to [the relevant good].
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
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This is the basic form of constitutional rights to “an environment that is not harmful
to their health or well-being” (section 24); housing (section 26); and health, food, water,
and social security (section 27).
A provision of this kind does not clearly create or disable judicial enforcement. On
the basis of the text alone, it would be easy to imagine a judicial ruling to the effect that
enforcement is reserved to nonjudicial actors within “the state.” On this view, the South
African Constitution is, with respect to judicial enforcement, closely akin to the Indian
Constitution. But it would also be easy to imagine a ruling to the effect that courts are
required to police the relevant rights, by ensuring that the state has, in fact, taken
“reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
progressive realisation of this right.” If, for example, the state has done little to provide
people with decent food and health care, and if the state is financially able to do much
more, it would seem that the state has violated the constitutional guarantee.
In certifying the Constitution, the South African Constitutional Court resolved this
question in just this way, concluding that socio-economic rights are indeed subject to
judicial enforcement.8 The Court said that such rights “are, at least to some extent,
justiciable.” The fact that resources would have to be expended on them was hardly
decisive, for this was true of “many of the civil and political rights entrenched” in the
Constitution. The Court correctly said that many rights, including so-called negative
rights, “will give rise to similar budgetary implications without compromising their
justiciability.” But in a final sentence, the Court added new ambiguity, by suggesting that
at “the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be protected negatively from improper
invasion.” This last sentence added considerable ambiguity, because it did not say
whether and when courts could go beyond the “minimum” to protect rights “positively”;
nor did it make entirely clear what it would mean to invade socio-economic rights
“negatively.” Perhaps the Court’s suggestion was that when the state, or someone else,
actually deprived someone of (for example) shelter, say by evicting them form the only
available source of housing, judicial enforcement would be appropriate. But if this is
what the Court meant, the socio-economic rights would be hardly justiciable at all; this
would be an exceedingly narrow use of judicial authority in overseeing the relevant
rights.
The ultimate outcome of the debate over judicial protection of socio-economic
rights carries both particular and general interest. It is of particular interest in South
Africa, where a substantial percentage of the population lives in desperate poverty. Does
the Constitution do anything to help them? For example, might the judiciary play a role in
ensuring that governmental priorities are set in the way that the Constitution apparently
envisages? Or might judicial involvement in protecting socio-economic rights actually
impair reasonable legislature efforts to set sensible priorities? The outcome has general
interest because it should tell us a great deal about the social and democratic
consequences, both good and bad, of constitutional provisions creating socio-economic
rights. Thus far discussion of this issue has both highly speculative and uninformed by
8
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actual practice.9 The South African experience will inevitably provide a great deal of
information.
The Constitutional Court has now rendered its first major decision involving these
rights, in a case involving the right to shelter. It is to that case that I now turn.
II. The Background
A. The Housing Shortage and the Apartheid Legacy
It is impossible to understand the South African dispute over the right to shelter, or
the proceedings in the Constitutional Court, without reference to the effects of apartheid.
The central point is that in the view of most observers, the system of apartheid is directly
responsible for the acute housing shortage in many areas of the nation.
One of the central components of apartheid was a system of “influx control” that
sharply limited African occupation of urban areas.10 In the Western Cape, the government
attempted to exclude all African people and to give preference to the colored community.
The result was to freeze the provision of housing for African people on the Cape
Peninsula in 1962. Nonetheless, African people continued to move into the area in search
of jobs. Lacking formal housing, large numbers of them moved into “informal
settlements,” consisting of shacks and the like, throughout the Peninsula. The inevitable
result of the combination of large African movements into urban areas and inadequate
provision of housing was to produce shortages, amounting to over 100,000 units by the
mid-1990s. Since that time, governments at national and local levels have enacted a great
deal of legislation to try to handle the problem. Nonetheless, many thousands of people
lack decent housing. At the same time, the South African government has limited sources
and a large variety of needs, stemming from the AIDS crisis, pervasive unemployment
(about 40%), and persistent, pervasive poverty.
B. Grootboom and Wallacedene
The Grootboom case was brought by 900 plaintiffs, of whom 510 were children. For
a long period, the plaintiffs lived in an informal squatter settlement named Wallacedene.
Most of the people there were desperately poor. All of them lived in shacks, without
water, sewage, or refuse removal services. Only 5% of the shacks had electricity. The
named plaintiff, Irene Grootboom, lived with her family and that of her sister in a shack
of about twenty square meters.
Many of those at the Wallacedene settlement had applied for low-cost housing from
the municipality. They were placed on the waiting list, where they remained for a number
of years. In late 1998, they became frustrated by the intolerable conditions at
Wallacedene. They moved out and put up shacks and shelters on vacant land that was
9
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privately owned and earmarked for formal low-cost housing. A few months later, the
owner obtained an ejectment order against them. But Grootboom and others refused to
leave, contending that their former sites were now occupied and that there was nowhere
else to go. Eventually they were forcibly evicted, with their homes burnt and bulldozed.
Their possessions were destroyed. At this point they found shelter on a sports field in
Wallacedene, under temporary structures consisting of plastic sheets. It was at this stage
that they contended that their constitutional rights had been violated. It is worthwhile to
pause over the nature of human existence for those at Wallacedene. For them, insecurity
was a fact of daily life. It should not be controversial to say that the status of citizenship
is badly compromised for people in such conditions.
C. The Constitution
Two provisions were of central importance to the plaintiffs’ claim. The first is section
26, which provides:
“26(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished,
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances . No
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.”
The second was section 28(1)(c), limited to children. That section reads:
“28 Every child has the right – . . .
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed
from the family environment:
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services.”
At the outset several points should be made about these sections. First, section 26(3)
imposes a duty on the private sector, not only on government. Under this section, it is
unconstitutional for a private person to evict another private person, or to demolish a
home, without judicial permission. From the constitutional point of view, this is a striking
innovation, for constitutions do not typically impose obligations on private landlords.
From the standpoint of economic policy, it also raises several interesting questions.
Obviously the goal of section 26(3) is to ensure that poor people continue to have
housing; but the creation of a kind of property right in continued occupancy is likely to
have some unintended bad consequences. If it is difficult to evict people, landlords will
have a decreased incentive to provide housing in the first instance. The result might be a
diminished stock of private housing. Another result might be extensive private screening
of prospective tenants, since landlords will be entirely aware that once a tenancy is
allowed, it will be very difficult to terminate it. The extent of these effects is of course an
empirical question.
Do the following pages confuse sections 26 and 28? I indicated all the specific spots where I
think it should be changed. THANKS!
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For purposes of constitutional interpretation, the largest puzzle has to do with the
relationship between sections 26 and 28. It would be possible to read section 28 as
giving children unqualified rights to various goods – ensuring that children have those
goods even if resources are scarce. On this view, the government has an absolute
obligation to ensure that children eat, are housed, and have health care and social
services. Under this interpretation, section 26 creates as qualified right for everyone
(“progressive realisation”) whereas section 28 requires an unqualified right for children
in particular. Whether or not it is correct, this is a textually plausible reading.
The lower court proceeded in exactly this way, holding that section 28 creates a
freestanding, absolute right, on the part of children, to the protections thus mentioned. On
this interpretation, the rights are not qualified by “available resources” or by the
“progressive realisation” clause. Perhaps children are given, by that clause, two sets of
rights: first to the care of adults, preferably parents; second to state support of basic
needs.
III. Grootboom in the Constitutional Court
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court rejected this interpretation of section 28 . At
the same time, it held that section 26 imposes a judicially enforceable duty on
government; that what is required in “reasonableness”; and that the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights had been violated, because of the absence of a program to ensure
provide “temporary relief” for those without shelter. In short, the Court held that the
Constitution required not only a long-term plan to provide low-income shelter, but also a
system to ensure short-term help for people who had no place to live. I believe that this
is the first time that the high Court of any nation has issued a ruling of this general sort.
What is most striking about that ruling is the distinctive and novel approach to socioeconomic rights, requiring not shelter for everyone, but sensible priority-setting, with
particular attention to the plight of those who are neediest. I will say more by way of
evaluation below; let us begin by tracing the Court’s explanation of its decision.
A. Section 26
1. A note from international law. The movement for socio-economic rights cannot be
understood without reference to international law, which firmly recognizes such
rights, and which seems to put the weight of international opinion behind them.
Hence the Court began by emphasizing the significant background provided by the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (a covenant signed
but not yet ratified by South Africa).
Section 11.1 of the Covenant provides that the parties “recognize the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”
Hence the “parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right . . .” A
more general provision of the Covenant, applicable to all relevant rights, makes a
promise “to take steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
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achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognized in the Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”11
But what does this mean? The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights is entrusted with monitoring the performance of states under the
Covenant. In its interpretive comments, the Committee urges that states face a “minimum
core obligation,” consisting of a duty to “ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least,
minimum essential levels of each of the rights.” The Constitutional Court referred to this
idea with some interest, suggesting the possibility of “minimum core obligations”
imposed by section 26. But in the Court’s view, that idea had many problems, because
judicial enforcement would require a great deal of information to be placed before the
court, in order to “determine the minimum core in any given context.” In this case,
sufficient information was lacking, and in any event the Court thought that it would not
be necessary to define the minimum core in order to assess Grootboom’s complaint.
2. Text and context. The Court’s more specific analysis of section 26 began with an
emphasis on the fact that all people have a right, not to shelter regardless of financial
constraints, but to legislative and other measures designed to achieve “the progressive
realization of this right.” At the same time, the state, and “all other entities and persons,”
are constitutionally required “to desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to
adequate housing.” By itself this idea is quite ambiguous; what counts as prevention or
impairment?
The Court explained that to implement the right, the state faced two kinds of duties.
With respect to “those who can afford to pay for adequate housing,” the state’s duty is to
“unlock[] the system, providing access to housing stock and a legislative framework to
facilitate self-built houses through planning laws and access to finance.” What is most
striking here is the Court’s emphasis on the “unlocking” role of the Constitution. On one
interpretation, at least, the state is under a duty to ban a system of monopoly in housing –
to create market s sufficiently flexible to provide housing to those who can pay for it. But
it is not clear that this is all, or even most, of what the Court had in mind. The idea of
“planning laws” and “access to finance” might be taken to mean something other than, or
in addition to, a competitive housing market. But it is certainly worth noticing that the
analysis of a duty for “those who can afford to pay”operates along its own separate track,
requiring a kind of open housing market for those with the resources to participate.
For poor people, of course, the state’s obligation is different. Here the constitutional
duty might be discharged through “programmes to provide adequate social assistance to
those who are otherwise unable to support themselves and their dependents.” In this case,
the central issue was whether the government had created “reasonable” measures to
ensure progressive realization of the right. The Court concluded that it had not,
notwithstanding the extensive public apparatus to facilitate access to housing. The reason
for this conclusion was simple: “there is no express provision to facilitate access to
temporary relief for people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, for
people who are living in intolerable conditions and for people who are in crisis because
11
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of natural disasters such as floods or fires, or because their homes are under threat of
demolition.”
The Court acknowledged that it would be acceptable not to have a provision for
those in desperate need “if the nationwide housing programme would result in affordable
houses for most people within a reasonably short time.” Note that “most people” does not
mean all people; hence the clear implication is that a deprivation of housing, for some,
would not necessarily be unreasonable or inconsistent with the constitutional plan. In this
respect, the constitutional right involved the creation of a system of a certain kind rather
than the creation of fully individual protections. But under the existing governmental
program at the national level, it could not be said that “most people” would have
“affordable houses” within a reasonably short time. Hence the nation’s housing program
is constitutionally unacceptable insofar as “it fails to recognize that the state must
provide for relief for those in desperate need. . . . It is essential that a reasonable part of
the national housing budget be devoted to this, but the precise allocation is for the
national government to decide in the first instance.”
The Court also acknowledged that the constitutional obligation might be adequately
carried out at the local level and that the local government, Cape Metro, had put in place
its own land programme specifically to deal with desperate needs. But that programme
had not been implemented, in large part because of an absence of adequate budgetary
support from the national government. “Recognition of such needs in the nationwide
housing programme requires” the national government “to plan, budget and monitor the
fulfilment of immediate needs and the management of crises. This shall ensure that a
significant number of desperate people in need are afforded relief, though not all of them
need receive it immediately.”
In the Court’s view, the Constitution did not create a right to “shelter or housing
immediately upon demand.” But it did create a right to a “coherent, co-ordinated
programme designed to meet” constitutional obligations. The obligation of the state was
therefore to create such a program, including reasonable measures specifically designed
“to provide relief for people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and
who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations.” It is here that we can find a
novel, distinctive, and promising approach to a democratic constitution’s socio-economic
rights, an issue that I take up in more detail below.
B. Section 28
So much for Section 26 . What of Section 28 , which, it might be recalled, was
understood by the lower court to create an absolute right to shelter for children? In brief,
the Court refused to interpret section 28 in this way. Instead it understood section 28 to
add little to the basic requirements of section 26?. In the Court's view, section 28 creates
no independent socio-economic rights. This was an exceedingly narrow reading of
section 28 , evidently a product of pragmatic considerations. The Court’s responsiveness
to those pragmatic considerations is itself noteworthy, especially insofar as it suggests
judicial reluctance to intrude excessively into priority-setting at the democratic level.
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The Court's central holding was that with respect to children, the obligation to
provide shelter and the like "is imposed primarily on parents and family, and only
alternatively on the state." What this means is that when children are removed from their
parents, the state must protect the specified rights by, for example, ensuring that children
are housed and fed. But section 28 "does not create any primary state obligation to
provide shelter on demand to parents and their children if children are being cared for by
their parents or families."
To be sure, the state has some constitutional duty to children under the care of
their parents and families. The state "must provide the legal and administrative
infrastructure necessary to ensure" compliance with section 28, through, for example,
"passing laws and creating enforcement mechanisms for the maintenance of children,
their protection from maltreatment, abuse, neglect or degradation." The state is also
obliged to comply with the various independent protections of socio-economic rights. But
section 26 created no freestanding obligation for the state to shelter children within the
care of their parents. Since the children in Grootboom were being cared for by their
parents, the state was not obliged to shelter them "in terms of section 28(1)."
At first glance, this is a puzzling reading of section 28(1), hardly foreordained by
the text of the provision. Apparently the Court was led to that reading by what it saw as
the "anomalous result" of giving those with children "a direct and enforceable right to
housing" under that section, while depriving those "who have none or whose children are
adult." This would be anomalous because it would allow parents to have special access to
shelter if and because they had children. In any case a holding to this effect would make
children into "stepping stones to housing for their parents." But would this really be so
anomalous? It might seem to make sense to say that children should have a particular
priority here – that their right should be more absolute – and hence that adults with
children would have a preferred position. Why would that view be especially peculiar?
The Court also expressed a stronger concern. If children were taken to have an
absolute right to shelter, the document's limitations on socio-economic rights would be
quite undone. The "carefully constructed constitutional scheme for progressive
realisation of socio-economic rights would make little sense if it could be trumped in
every case by the rights of children." Here, I think, is the heart of the Court’s skepticism
about the idea that section 28 should be taken to create absolute rights. If section 28
were so understood, it would trump even reasonable priority-setting, thus disallowing the
state from deciding that in view of sharply limited resources, certain needs were even
more pressing.
IV. Evaluation
What I will urge here is that the approach of the South African Constitutional
Court answers a number of questions about the proper relationship among socioeconomic rights, constitutional law, and democratic deliberation. There should be little
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question that people who live in desperate conditions cannot live good lives. People who
live in such conditions are also unable to enjoy the status of citizenship.
On the other hand, legislatures in poor nations, and perhaps in less poor ones,
cannot easily ensure that everyone lives in decent conditions. An especially plausible
concern with socio-economic rights is the difficulty, for courts, of steering a middle
course between two straightforward positions: (a) the socio-economic rights are
nonjusticiable and (b) the socio-economic rights create an absolute duty, on government's
part, to ensure protection for everyone who needs them. The second position is of course
the standard approach to most constitutional rights. If the government has violated
someone’s right to free speech, or to freedom of religion, it does not matter that the rights
of most people, or almost everyone else, have been respected. This sentence needs
completion.
As I have emphasized, however, all rights have costs.12 The right to free speech,
or for that matter to freedom from police abuse, will not be protected unless taxpayers are
willing to fund a judicial system willing and able to protect that right and that freedom. In
fact a system committed to free speech is also likely to require taxpayer resources to be
devoted to keeping open certain arenas where speech can occur, such as streets and parks.
In protecting the most conventional rights, the government must engage in some form of
priority-setting. But when cases go to court, conventional rights are and can be fully
protected at the individual level, and not merely through the creation of some kind of
“reasonable” overall system for protection. The existence of a reasonable overall system
for protecting free speech rights is not defense to a claim that, in a particular case, a right
to free speech has been violated.
By their very nature, socio-economic rights are different on this count, certainly in
the light of the “progressive realisation” clause. No one thinks that every individual
[Should it be “everyone” or “every individual”?] has an enforceable right to full protection of
the interests at stake. In these circumstances it is difficult indeed to find an approach that
avoids two unappealing courses: creation of fully enforceable individual rights or a
conclusion of complete nonjusticiability. The only alternative to these extremes is an
approach to public law that is generally unfamiliar in constitutional law but that is the
ordinary material of administrative law, governing judicial control of administrative
agencies: a requirement of reasoned judgment, including reasonable priority-setting.
In a typical administrative law case, an agency is faced with a burden of
explanation. It must show why it has adopted the program that it has chosen; it must
account for its failure to adopt a program of a different sort. For courts, a special
attraction of this position is that it protects against administrative arbitrariness while also
recognizes the democratic pedigree of the agency and the simple fact of limited
resources. If an agency has allocated resources in a rational way, it has acted lawfully.

12

See Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights (1999).
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What the South African Constitution Court has basically done is to adopt an
administrative law model of socio-economic rights. Courts using that model are hardly
unwilling to invalidate an agency's choices as arbitrary. That, in effect, is what the
Constitutional Court did in Grootboom. The Court required government to develop, and
fund, a program by which a large number of poor people are given access to emergency
housing. What the Court call for is some sort of reasonable plan, designed to ensure that
relief will be forthcoming to a significant percentage of poor people. On this view, the
Constitution constrains government, not by ensuring that everyone receives shelter, but
by requiring government to devote more resources than it otherwise would to the problem
of insufficient housing for the poor. More particularly, the Court requires government to
maintain a plan for emergency relief for those who need it. This is the particular gap
found unacceptable in Grootboom.
But there is a twist here. For those whose socio-economic rights are violated, the
real problem is one of government inaction – a failure to implement a program of the sort
that, in the view of some, the Constitution requires. The plaintiffs in Grootboom were
seeking government action that had not, to that point, been forthcoming, in the particular
form of a right to emergency relief. Hence the Grootboom Court’s approach is most
closely connected to a subset of administrative law principles, involving judicial review
of inaction by government agencies. In cases of this kind, everyone knows that the
agency faces a resource constraint and that in the face of a limited budget, any reasonable
priority-setting will be valid and perhaps even free from judicial review. At the same
time, there should be a duty of reasonableness in priority-setting, and an agency decision
that rejects a statutory judgment, or that does not take statutory goals sufficiently
seriously, should be held invalid. In the constitutional context, this is what the South
African Court ruled in Grootboom.
The broader point here is that a constitutional right to shelter, or to food, can
strengthen the hand of those who might be unable to make much progress in the political
arena, perhaps because they are unsympathetic figures, perhaps because they are
disorganized and lack political power. A socio-economic guarantee can have an enduring
function. It can do so in part by promoting a certain kind of deliberation, not by
preempting it, as a result of directing political attention to interests that would otherwise
be disregarded in ordinary political life.
Conclusion
Should constitutions protect social and economic rights? It is certainly relevant
that if basic needs are not met, people cannot really enjoy the status of citizens. A right to
minimal social and economic guarantees can be justified, not only on the ground that
people in desperate conditions will not have good lives, but also on the ground that
democracy requires a certain independence and security for all citizens. But there are
many complexities here. A government might attempt to meet people’s needs in multiple
ways, perhaps by creating incentives to ensure that people will help themselves, rather
than by looking to government. Perhaps there is no special need for constitutional
safeguards here; perhaps this is an issue that can be settled democratically. In any case
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social and economic guarantees threaten to put courts in a role for which they are quite
ill-suited. While modern constitutions tend to protect those guarantees, we can
understand the judgment that, in some nations, they would create more trouble than they
are worth.
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court of South Africa was confronted, for the
first time, with the question of how, exactly, courts should protect socio-economic rights.
The Court’s approach suggests, also for the first time, the possibility of providing that
protection in a way that is respectful of democratic prerogatives and the simple fact of
limited budgets.
In making clear that the socio-economic rights are not given to individuals as
such, the Court was at pains to say that the right to housing is not absolute. [Shouldn’t it be
“even children’s right to housing”? with regards to adults, the constitution is explicit that these
rights are not absolute. -- stet] This suggestion underlies the narrow interpretation of the

provision involving children and also the Court’s unambiguous suggestion that the state
need not provide housing for everyone who needs it. What the constitutional right
requires is not housing on demand, but a reasonable program for ensuring access to
housing for poor people, including some kind of program for ensuring emergency relief.
This approach ensures respect for sensible priority-setting, and close attention to
particular needs, without displacing democratic judgments about how to set priorities.
This is now the prevailing approach to the constitutional law of socio-economic rights in
South Africa.
Of course the approach leaves many issues unresolved. Suppose that the
government ensured a certain level of funding for a program of emergency relief;
suppose too that the specified level is challenged as insufficient. The Court's decision
suggests that whatever amount allocated must be shown to be "reasonable"; but what are
the standards are resolving a dispute about that issue? The deeper problem is that any
allocations of resources for providing shelter will prevent resources from going elsewhere
– for example, for AIDS treatment and prevention, for unemployment compensation, for
food, for basic income support. Undoubtedly the Constitutional Court will listen carefully
to government claims that resources not devoted to housing are being used elsewhere.
Undoubtedly those claims will be stronger if they suggest that some or all of the
resources are being used to protect socio-economic rights of a different sort.
What is most important, however, is the Constitutional Court’s adoption of a
novel and highly promising approach to judicial protection of socio-economic rights. The
ultimate effects of the approach remain to be seen. But by requiring reasonable programs,
with careful attention to limited budgets, the Court has suggested the possibility of
assessing claims of constitutional violations without at the same time requiring more than
existing resources will allow. And in so doing, the Court has provided the most
convincing rebuttal yet to those who have claimed, in the abstract quite plausibly, that
judicial protection of socio-economic rights could not possibly be a good idea. We now
have reason to believe that a democratic constitution, even in a poor nation, is able to
protect those rights, and to do so without placing an undue strain on judicial capacities.
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Readers with comments should address them to:
Cass R. Sunstein
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